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Abstract
We study the logic of neighbourhood models with pointwise intersec-
tion, as a means to characterize multi-modal logics. Pointwise intersection
takes us from a set of neighbourhood sets Ni (one for each member i of
a set G, used to interpret the modality i) to a new neighbourhood set
NG, which in turn allows us to interpret the operator G. Here, X is in
the neighbourhood for G if and only if X equals the intersection of some
Y = {Yi | i ∈ G}. We show that the notion of pointwise intersection has
various applications in epistemic and doxastic logic, deontic logic, coalition
logic, and evidence logic. We then establish sound and strongly complete
axiomatizations for the weakest logic characterized by pointwise intersec-
tion and for a number of variants, using a new and generally applicable
technique for canonical model construction.
Keywords: modal logic, neighbourhood semantics, group operators, dis-
tributed belief
1 Introduction
Neighbourhood semantics is a well-established tool to study generalizations and
variants of Kripke-semantics for modal logic.1 They have been successfully
applied to i.a. the logic of ability [4,24], the dynamics of evidence and beliefs [28],
conflict-tolerant deontic logic [13], and the analysis of (descriptive or normative)
conditionals [5, 20].
Formally, a neighbourhood function N : W → ℘(℘(W )) yields a set of
accessible sets X1, X2, . . . of worlds for every given world w in a possible worlds
∗Post-doctoral fellow of the Flemish Research Foundation – FWO Vlaanderen. We are
indebted to Olivier Roy and Eric Pacuit for comments on preparatory notes for this paper.
†The work of DK was partially supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG)
and Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) as part of the joint project Collective Attitude
Formation [RO 4548/8-1] and by DFG and Grantova´ Agentura Cˇeske´ Republiky (GACˇR) as
part of the joint project From Shared Evidence to Group Attitudes [RO 4548/6-1].
1Scott [25] and Montague [21] are often seen as the inventors of neighbourhood models;
Chellas [6] and Segerberg [26] are usually cited as the main figures in their development.
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model. ϕ is then true iff there is some such X in the neighbourhood set N (w),
that coincides with the truth set of ϕ (cf. Definitions 1 and 2 below).
The move from Kripke semantics to neighbourhood semantics allows us to
invalidate certain schemata that are problematic for a given interpretation of the
modal operator , but also to include other schemata that would trivialize any
normal modal logic.2 Apart from that, neighbourhood models can also be used
as a purely technical vehicle in order to arrive at completeness or incompleteness
w.r.t. less abstract possible worlds semantics.3
Many applications in philosophy and AI require a multitude of modal op-
erators 1,2, . . ., where the indices may represent agents (logic of agency,
doxastic or epistemic logic), non-logical axioms or reasons (logic of provability
or normative reasoning), or sources of a norm (deontic logic) or of evidence
(doxastic logic once more). Just as for Kripke-semantics, the step from the
setting with only one modal operator to a multi-indexed one is easily made, as
long as no interaction among the various operators, resp. neighbourhood func-
tions is presupposed. However, the logic of neighbourhood models where certain
neighbourhood functions are obtained by operations on (one or several) other
neighbourhood functions is still largely unknown. This stands in sharp con-
trast to the current situation in Kripke-semantics, cf. the abundant literature
on Dynamic Logic [16] and on Boolean Modal Logic [10, 11].
The current paper is a first step towards filling this gap. In particular,
we study logics that are interpreted in terms of the pointwise intersection of
neighbourhoods. This concept is defined as follows, for a fixed (finite or infinite)
index set I = {1, 2, . . .} and a fixed set of atomic propositions P.
Definition 1 A model M is a triple 〈W, 〈Ni〉i∈I , V 〉, where W 6= ∅ is the do-
main of M, for every i ∈ I, Ni : W → ℘(℘(W )) is a neighbourhood function
for i, and V : P→ ℘(W ) is a valuation function.
Where M = 〈W, 〈Ni〉i∈I , V 〉 is a model and G = {i1, . . . , in} ⊆ I, the neigh-
bourhood function for G is given by
NG(w) = {Xi1 ∩ . . . ∩Xin | each Xij ∈ Nij (w)}
So, in the context of neighbourhood semantics, pointwise intersection takes
as input any intersection of neighbourhoods, one for each agent i ∈ G, to form
the new neighbourhood set for G. This new neighbourhood set is then used
to interpret expressions of the type Gϕ, by means of the standard semantic
clause, plugging in the neighbourhood function NG.4
2See Table 1 in Section 5.1 for examples.
3One prototypical example of a completeness proof via neighbourhood semantics is [20].
In [15], neighbourhood semantics are used to prove the incompleteness of Elgesem’s modal
logic of agency [7]. We refer to [23] for a critical introduction to the many forms, uses and
advantages of neighbourhood semantics.
4One obvious question, especially if we do not assume that the neighbourhood sets Ni(w)
are closed under intersection, is whether we can also have pointwise intersection of a neigh-
bourhood set with itself. The short answer is: yes, we can, but this takes us beyond the scope
of this conference paper. We return to this point in our concluding section.
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Beside its mathematical interest, pointwise intersection has many potential
applications. In Section 2, we briefly point out a few of these. Sections 3–5 form
the technical core of the paper, providing (strong) soundness and completeness
results for a number of logics interpreted in terms of models with pointwise
intersection. We conclude with a summary and some open questions for future
work.
2 Applications
What follows is a non-exhaustive list of (potential) applications of logics with
pointwise intersection. We leave the full elaboration of these ideas for later
occasions, and whenever possible, provide pointers to the literature for more
background information.
Epistemic and Doxastic Logic The distributed knowledge of a group of
agents G can be conceived as the knowledge that would be obtained if some
third agent combined the individual knowledge of all group members G and
closed the result under logical consequence [1]. The logic of this notion is then
defined as an extension of a multi-agent version of S5, where each operator G
(G ⊆ I) is interpreted in terms of the intersection of the equivalence relations
Ri (i ∈ G).5 Analogously, one can study distributed beliefs of a group G as the
result of aggregating (or pooling) all the beliefs of the members of G. Formally,
distributed belief can be seen as all combinations of pieces of belief, one for each
agent. When beliefs are conceived as neighbourhoods, the operation of pooling
one’s beliefs corresponds to a pointwise intersection.
In his [27] Robert Stalnaker has proposed a combined epistemic-doxastic
logic that interprets belief as the mental component of knowledge. In the frame-
work, he abandons the assumption that knowledge is negatively introspective.
Also positive introspection has been heavily critisized on philosophical grounds.
Correspondingly, [19] propose two logics that weaken Stalnaker’s framework fur-
ther by also omitting positive introspection. It turns out that this renders belief
a non-normal modality: belief is closed under weakening but not under intersec-
tion, i.e. the agent can believe ϕ and ψ without believing ϕ∧ψ. This is but one
example of a non-normal logic for knowledge and belief. All such logics raise
the question of defining group attitudes for non-normal modal logics akin to the
distributed knowledge and belief defined above. Our results show that group
versions of non-normal knowledge and belief can be easily axiomatized. To use
a slogan: we can throw away the normal modal logic bathwater, while keeping
the distributed knowledge/belief baby.
5The logic of distributed knowledge is investigated in the seminal work [8]. A small warning
is in place here though. As Gerbrandy [12] shows, the notion of distributed knowledge has
both a syntactic and a semantic reading, which are not entirely equivalent. Fagin and co-
authors [8], and most others in the field focus on the semantically driven view.
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Evidence Logic The framework of Evidence Logic was proposed in [28] to
study the way beliefs (of a given agent) are grounded in (possibly conflicting)
evidence. Technically, evidence logics are obtained by adding a monotonic op-
erator6 E for “the agent has evidence for ...” and a belief operator B of the type
KD45 to classical logic. E is characterized semantically in terms of a neigh-
bourhood function N , where X ∈ N (w) expresses that at w, the agent has
evidence for X . The belief state at a world w is interpreted as the union of all
intersections
⋂
X , where X is a maximal set of evidence such that
⋂
X 6= ∅.
Going multi-agent with this framework is fairly straightforward. Here, our
results can e.g. be used to study the piecemeal aggregation of evidence from var-
ious different sources, and how diverging strategies to do so impact the resulting
belief set. Formally, X ∈ N{i,j,k}(w) indicates that X is a result of aggregating
pieces of evidence of the sources i, j, and k. One interesting epistemological
question – that can now be studied at a logical level – is whether it makes a dif-
ference if one first aggregates the evidence among the sources, before computing
a set of beliefs, rather than using the evidence in its original form (ignoring the
sources) to ground the beliefs.
Deontic Logic Neighbourhood semantics have been used in Deontic Logic to
model (non-explosive) conflict-tolerant normative reasoning [13, 14]. Here, iϕ
can e.g. be used to express that there is at least one norm in the normative
system Si that makes ϕ obligatory; the presence of two conflicting norms in Si
can then account for the truth of a deontic conflict of the type iϕ ∧ i¬ϕ.
In this context, pointwise intersection can be interpreted as the piecemeal ag-
gregation of norms from different normative systems; a formula such as {1,2}p
then expresses that there are two norms, one in S1, the other in S2, such that
obeying both norms entails that p is the case.
An altogether different application of the formal framework developed here
consists in reading the indices as reasons for one’s obligations. On this view,
rϕ expresseses that r is a reason for ϕ to be obligatory, and one can then
aggregate reasons alongside with obligations: rϕ∧r′ψ yields {r,r′}(ϕ∧ψ).
As argued in [9, 22], reasons play an important, but often neglected role in our
normative reasoning; a thorough logical investigation of their interaction and
aggregation in deontic logic is still largely lacking.
Coalition Logic, group abilities As shown in [3], Pauly’s Coalition Logic
[24] corresponds to the ability-fragment of STIT logic [2, 18]. Moreover, this
fragment is known to be decidable, in contrast to full STIT logic for groups [17].
In Coalition Logic, Gϕ expresses that “the group of agents G has the ability
to ensure that ϕ is the case”, or in more game-theoretic terminology, “G is
α-effective for ϕ”. The modality G is monotonic, meaning that we can only
express what one of the group’s choices necessitates – not what defines that
6A modal operator  is monotonic in a given system iff it satisfies the rule: from ϕ ⊢ ψ,
to infer ϕ ⊢ ψ.
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choice.7 With the results of the current paper, we can now also obtain sound
and complete logics for exact ability (resp. effectivity), where Gϕ means that
“G can make a choice that is defined by ϕ”, or in more mundane terms: “G can
do exactly ϕ”.
3 The Base Logic
In the remainder we use M, M′ to refer to arbitrary models as given by Defini-
tion 1. X,Y, . . . are used to refer to sets of worlds in a model, and w,w′, . . . for
single worlds. We write G ⊆f I to denote that G is a finite subset of I.
Let L be the language obtained by closing a countable set of propositional
variables P = {p, q, . . .} and the logical constants ⊥,⊤ under the classical con-
nectives and all unary modal operators of the type G, where G ⊆f I. We use
ϕ, ψ, . . . as metavariables for formulas and Γ,∆, . . . as metavariables for sets of
formulas. To interpret L, we use the models given by Definition 1 together with
the following (standard) semantic clauses:8
Definition 2 Where M = 〈W, 〈Ni〉i∈I , V 〉 is a model, w ∈ W , ϕ, ψ ∈ L, and
G ⊆f I:
0. M, w 6|= ⊥
1. M, w |= ϕ iff w ∈ V (ϕ) for all ϕ ∈ P
2. M, w |= ¬ϕ iff M, w 6|= ϕ
3. M, w |= ϕ ∨ ψ iff M, w |= ϕ or M, w |= ψ
4. M, w |= Gϕ iff ‖ϕ‖M ∈ NG(w)
where ‖ϕ‖M = {w ∈W |M, w |= ϕ}.
Validity( ϕ) and semantic consequence (Γ  ϕ), for a given class of models,
are defined in the standard way, viz. as truth, resp. truth-preservation at all
worlds in all models in that class.
In the remainder of this paper, we will consider various logics that are ob-
tained by imposing certain frame conditions on the models defined above. We
start with the base logic, i.e. the logic characterized by the class of all models.
To characterize this logic syntactically, we will need the following axioms in
addition to classical logic (henceforth, CL):
7Technically, G is monotonic iff it satisfies the rule (RM): if ϕ and ϕ ⊢ ψ, then ψ. We
discuss this rule in Section 5.4.
8We treat ⊥,¬,∨ as primitive; the other connectives and ⊤ are defined in the standard
way.
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where G ∩H = ∅ : (Gϕ ∧Hψ)→ G∪H(ϕ ∧ ψ) (B1)
G∪H⊤ → G⊤ (B2)
(Gϕ ∧G∪H∪Jϕ)→ G∪Hϕ (B3)
(Gϕ ∧H(ϕ ∨ ψ))→ G∪Hϕ (B4)
and, as usual, replacement of equivalents and modus ponens:
if ϕ ⊢ ψ and ψ ⊢ ϕ, then Gϕ ⊢ Gψ (RE)
if ⊢ ϕ and ⊢ ϕ→ ψ, then ⊢ ψ (MP)
Let us quickly offer some interpretations of these axioms. (B1) is an obvious
syntactic consequence of taking intersections: If ‖ϕ‖M is in G’s neighbourhood
and ‖ψ‖M is in H ’s neighbourhood, then ‖ϕ ∧ ψ‖M is in their intersection
neighbourhood whenever G and H are disjoint. Note that the latter restriction
is required; without it, the axiom is not sound for the base logic.9 Axiom
(B2) states that W can only be in G’s intersection neighbourhood if it is in
the neighbourhood of each member of G. (B3) expresses a property of convex
closure: if X ∈ NG(w) and X ∈ NG∪H∪J (w), then for all i ∈ H , there must
be a Yi ∈ Ni(w) such that X ⊆ Yi. Consequentially, also X ∈ NG∪H(w). (B4)
follows the same reasoning as (B3) but is logically independent. In the appendix
we prove the following:
Lemma 1 Axioms (B1)-(B4) are logically independent from each other.
Before we move to the completeness proof, some terminological remarks are
needed. In this and the next section, we use Hilbert-style axiomatizations, with
(MP) and (RE) as our only rules. We work with axiom schemata; an axiom
is any instance of an axiom schema in L. Every formula in L that can be
derived by the axioms and rules is a theorem of the logic. Finally, consequence
relations are defined from the respective axiomatizations as follows: Γ ⊢ ϕ iff
there are ψ1, . . . , ψn ∈ Γ such that (ψ1 ∧ . . .∧ ψn)→ ϕ is a theorem. Note that
this means that the syntactic consequence relation of the defined logics is by
definition compact.
4 Strong Completeness for the Base Logic
In this section, we prove the following:
9To see why, note that neighbourhood functions are not generally assumed to be closed
under intersection: X, Y ∈ Ni(w) does not imply X ∩ Y ∈ N (w). The unrestricted version of
(B1) includes the case where G = H = {i}, which is only sound if neighbourhoods are closed
under intersection. We return to this point in Section 5.5.
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Theorem 1 (Strong Completeness for the Base Logic) A sound and strongly
complete axiomatization of the base logic is obtained by adding (B1), (B2), (B3),
and (B4) to any sound and complete axiomatization of CL, and closing the re-
sult under (RE) and (MP).
The proof of soundness is a matter of routine; it suffices to check that all the
axioms are sound with respect to the class of all neighbourhood models. For
the completeness proof, we need to construct a canonical model Mc, in which
every world corresponds to a maximal consistent set (MCS) of formulas Λ ⊆ L.
The main difficulty here is to construct the Ni in such a way that (a) if a given
formula Gϕ has to be true at a world w, then the pointwise intersection of the
neighbourhoods Ni(w) for i ∈ G will contain ‖ϕ‖M, but also (b) if ¬Gϕ is to
be true at world w, then no pointwise intersection of sets in Ni(w) for i ∈ G
will generate ‖ϕ‖M, i.e. we don’t create too many intersection sets. To arrive
at (b), we will need to make copies of each MCS Λ.
Let G = {G | G ⊆f I}. Let F denote the set of all functions f : G × L → I
such that, for all G ∈ G and all ϕ ∈ L, f(G,ϕ) ∈ G. The members of F are
used as indices for the copies of the MCS in our canonical model:
Definition 3 The canonical model for the base logic isMc = 〈W c, 〈N ci 〉i∈I , V
c〉,
where
1. W c = {(Λ, f) | Λ is a MCS in L and f ∈ F};
2. For all ϕ ∈ P, V c(ϕ) = {(Λ, f) ∈ W c | ϕ ∈ Λ}
3. for all i ∈ I, N ci (Λ, f) = {X
G,ϕ
i | Gϕ ∈ Λ, i ∈ G ⊆f I} where,
4. for all (G,ϕ) ∈ G× L and i ∈ G,
X
G,ϕ
i = {(Λ, f) ∈ W
c | ϕ ∈ Λ or f(G,ϕ) 6= i}
It is not hard to check that Mc is well-defined; it suffices to show that W c
is non-empty, which holds in view of the soundness of the base logic, and by a
standard Lindenbaum construction.
The real difficulty consists in proving the truth lemma (Lemma 4 below).
To get there, we first prove two auxiliary lemmata:
Lemma 2 Let Y be a set of sets XG,ψi with i ∈ G and (G,ψ) ∈ G × L, such
that for no (G,ϕ), {XG,ϕi | i ∈ G} ⊆ Y. Then there is an f0 ∈ F such that
{(Λ, f0) ∈ W
c} ⊆
⋂
Y (1)
Proof. Suppose the antecedent holds. Let f ∈ F be such that, for every
X
G,ψ
i ∈ Y, f(G,ψ) = i
G,ψ for some iG,ψ ∈ G such that XG,ψ
iG,ψ
6∈ Y. In view
of the supposition, there is at least one such f . Note that, for all XG,ψi ∈ Y,
f(G,ψ) 6= i. By Definition 3, for all XG,ψi ∈ Y and all MCS Λ, (Λ, f) ∈ X
G,ψ
i .
Consequently, for all MCS Λ, (Λ, f) ∈
⋂
Y.
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Lemma 3 If Y = {XG,ϕi | i ∈ G}, then
⋂
Y = {(Λ, f) ∈W c | ϕ ∈ Λ}.
Proof. By Definition 3.4,
⋂
i∈G
X
G,ϕ
i =
⋂
i∈G
{(Λ, f) ∈ W c | ϕ ∈ Λ or f(G,ϕ) 6= i} (2)
In view of the definition of F, we know that for every i ∈ G, there is some
f ′ ∈ F such that f ′(G,ϕ) = i. Hence,
⋂
i∈G
{(Λ, f) ∈W c | ϕ ∈ Λ or f(G,ϕ) 6= i} = {(Λ, f) ∈ W c | ϕ ∈ Λ} (3)
Lemma 4 (Truth Lemma) For all (Λ, f) ∈W c and all ϕ ∈ L: Mc, (Λ, f) |=
ϕ iff ϕ ∈ Λ.
Proof. By an induction on the complexity of ϕ. The base case and the induction
step for the classical connectives are safely left to the reader. So it remains to
prove that
Mc, (Λ, f) |= Gϕ iff Gϕ ∈ Λ (TL)
Right to left direction of (TL). Suppose that Gϕ ∈ Λ. By Lemma 3,
⋂
i∈G
X
G,ϕ
i = {(Λ
′, f ′) ∈ W c | ϕ ∈ Λ′} (4)
So by the induction hypothesis (IH), we obtain:
⋂
i∈G
X
G,ϕ
i = ‖ϕ‖
M
c
(5)
Moreover, by Definition 3.3, for every i ∈ G, XG,ϕi ∈ N
c
i (Λ, f). By Definition
1,
⋂
i∈GX
G,ϕ
i ∈ NG(Λ, f). By Definition 2, M
c, (Λ, f) |= Gϕ.
Left to right direction of (TL). Suppose that Mc, (Λ, f) |= Gϕ. So there is
an X = {Xi | i ∈ G} such that each Xi ∈ N ci (Λ, f) and
⋂
X = ‖ϕ‖M
c
(6)
By Definition 3.4, for all i ∈ G, Xi = X
H,ψ
j for some H,ψ and j ∈ H such
that Hψ ∈ Λ. Let A = {(H,ψ) ∈ G × L | X
H,ψ
j ∈ X}. Note that, since G is
finite, also X and A are finite.
We distinguish two cases:
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Case 1: ϕ is a tautology of the base logic. By the IH, ‖ϕ‖M
c
=W . Hence each
Xi =W . In view of Definition 3.4, for all (H,ψ) ∈ A, ψ is also a tautology and
hence, by (RE), H⊤ ∈ Λ. By (B2), for all j ∈ H , j⊤ ∈ Λ. It follows that
i⊤ ∈ Λ for all i ∈ G. Since G is finite, we can derive G⊤ using (B1) finitely
many times. By (RE), Gϕ ∈ Λ.
Case 2: ϕ is not a tautology of the base logic. We first prove that, for some
K ⊆ G, Kϕ ∈ Λ. Let B = {(H,ψ) ∈ A | for all j ∈ H,X
N,ψ
j ∈ X and 6⊢ ψ}.
Note that10
⋃
(H,ψ)∈B
H ⊆ G (7)
For all (H,ψ), (H ′, ψ′) ∈ B : (H,ψ) = (H ′, ψ′) or H ∩H ′ = ∅ (8)
We can now rewrite the intersection of the members of X as follows:
⋂
X =
⋂
(H,ψ)∈A\B,XH,ψ
j
∈X
X
H,ψ
j ∩
⋂
(H,ψ)∈B,j∈H
X
H,ψ
j (9)
By Lemma 2, there is an f ′ ∈ F such that
{(Λ′, f ′) ∈W c} ⊆
⋂
(H,ψ)∈A\B,XH,ψ
j
∈X
X
H,ψ
j (10)
In view of Definition 3, Lemma 3, and the IH,
⋂
(H,ψ)∈B
{(Λ′, f ′) ∈W c | ψ ∈ Λ′} = {(Λ′, f ′) ∈W c | ϕ ∈ Λ′} (11)
Hence, every MCS that contains every member of {ψ | (H,ψ) ∈ B} also contains
ϕ, and vice versa. Since B is finite, this amounts to:
⊢
∧
(H,ψ)∈B
ψ ↔ ϕ. (12)
By Definition 3.3 and the fact that XH,ψj 6= X
H′,ψ
j′ when ψ is not a tautology
and j 6= j′, H 6= H ′ or ψ 6= ψ′ (cf. footnote 10) we have Hψ ∈ Λ for all
10To see why (7) and (8) hold, note that for each (H,ψ) ∈ B and each j ∈ H, there is
a witness XH,ψj ∈ X in view of the definition of B. Note moreover that, by Definition 3.4,
X
H,ψ
j 6= X
H′,ψ′
j′
whenever (H,ψ) 6= (H′, ψ′) or j 6= j′. So for every tuple ǫ = 〈H,ψ, j〉 with
(H,ψ) ∈ B and j ∈ H, there is a distinct iǫ ∈ G such that X
H,ψ
j = Xiǫ .
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(H,ψ) ∈ B. Let K =
⋃
(H,ψ)∈BH . Applying (B1) a suitable number of times,
we can derive that K
∧
(H,ψ)∈B ψ ∈ Λ. By (RE) and (12),
Kϕ ∈ Λ (13)
Let now i ∈ G. In view of the construction, there is an XHi,ψii ∈ X such
that
Hiψi ∈ Λ (14)
Since
⋂
X = ‖ϕ‖M
c
, it follows that XHi,ψii ⊇ ‖ϕ‖
M
c
. Let fi ∈ F be such
that fi(Hi) = i. Hence, X
Hi,ψi
i ∩ {(Λ, fi) ∈ W
c} = {(Λ, fi) ∈ W c | ψi ∈ Λ}.
This implies that {(Λ, fi) ∈W c | ψi ∈ Λ} ⊇ {(Λ, fi) | ϕ ∈ Λ}, and hence
⊢ ϕ→ ψi (15)
This implies that,
⊢ ψi ↔ (ϕ ∨ ψi) (16)
By (RE), and since i ∈ G was arbitrary, we have shown that for all i ∈ G,
Hi(ϕ ∨ ψi) ∈ Λ. Let G = {i1, . . . , in}. Now we apply (B4) a n times to derive
K∪Hi1
ϕ, K∪Hi1∪Hi2ϕ, etc., untill we finally arrive at K∪
⋃
i∈G
Hiϕ. Note
that K ⊆ G ⊆ K ∪
⋃
i∈GHi. From this and (13), we can derive that Gϕ ∈ Λ
by (B3).
5 Some Extensions
We now turn to a number of variants, obtained by imposing certain frame
conditions on the neighbourhood functions Ni. As will turn out, quite a number
of additional frame conditions on the Ni do not impact the axiomatization for
intersection neighbourhoods at all. Most results provided here will turn out to
be relatively straightforward, building on our canonical model construction and
completeness proof for the base logic. The proofs of all theorems in this section
are slight adaptions of the argument for Theorem 1. We offer some details on
the proofs in the appendix.
5.1 Some Extensions on the Cheap
We first discuss some axioms, resp. frame conditions that require no changes in
the construction of the canonical model, cf. Table 1. (NEC) and (P) are familiar
from the study of Kripke-semantics. Adding (CONEC) to any normal modal
logic will result in a trivial system; adding (COP) to any normal modal logic
will result in a logic where the modal operator becomes useless (since ϕ will be
10
W ∈ Ni(w) ⊢ i⊤ (NEC)
W 6∈ Ni(w) ⊢ ¬i⊤ (CONEC)
∅ 6∈ Ni(w) ⊢ ¬i⊥ (P)
∅ ∈ Ni(w) ⊢ i⊥ (COP)
Table 1: Some extensions on the cheap. Here, i ranges over all agents in I and
we always quantify universally over w.
a theorem for all ϕ). However, in the context of non-normal modal logics, both
axioms can sometimes make sense. The axiom (CONEC) is not often mentioned;
one of its concrete applications is in (non-normal) logics of agency [7]. The
underlying idea is that an agent i cannot (deliberately) bring about a tautology
like “the dishes are washed or they are not washed”. The axiom (COP) has
been used to characterize the notion of “deontic sufficiency” [29], often referred
to as “strong permission”. Here, ϕ means that every ϕ-world is a permissible
world; the axiom then follows trivially from the fact that no world verifies ⊥.
As far as these conditions are concerned, our results are modular, in the
sense that the frame conditions can be axiomatized independently; and we can
moreover restrict each of them to certain groups G. This means that we can e.g.
model cases where only one of the operators i satisfies necessitation, whereas
the others do not.
Theorem 2 The logic of any selection of frame conditions from Table 1 is
axiomatized by adding the corresponding axioms from that table to the base logic.
We should highlight that in the cases of (NEC), (CONEC) and (COP), the
corresponding frame condition also holds for the NG(w). For instance, as soon
as W ∈ Ni(w) for all i ∈ I, we can infer that W ∈ NG(w) for all G ⊆f I. At
the syntactic level, this is mirrored by the following property:
Lemma 5 For any extension ⊢ of the base logic: if for all i ∈ I, ⊢ i⊤ (resp.
⊢ ¬i⊤ or ⊢ i⊥ ), then for all G ⊆f I, ⊢ G⊤ (resp. ⊢ ¬G⊤ or ⊢ G⊥ ).
In other words, the three mentioned frame conditions and the corresponding
axioms readily transfer from single indices to groups. Consequently, imposing
these frame conditions on groups rather than individual indices will not make
any difference to the logic.
This is not true for (P). It is easy to construct a model with I = {1, 2} where
∅ 6∈ Ni(w) for i ∈ {1, 2} and all w, but ∅ ∈ N{1,2}(w) for some (or even all) w.
Theorem 3 The logic of frame condition ∅ 6∈ NG(w) in conjunction with any
selection of frame conditions from Table 1 is axiomatized by adding to the base
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logic the corresponding axioms from that table and all instances of the following
axiom schema:
¬G⊥ (PG)
Some combinations of the axioms from Table 1 obviously result in a trivial
logic if we use the same G everywhere. Note also that adding (NEC) to the
base logic allows us to derive the following theorem, using (B1):
Gϕ→ G∪Hϕ (SA)
(SA) stands for superadditivity, which is the common name used for this
type of axiom in logics of (group) agency, (distributed) belief, and (distributed)
knowledge. In the presence of (SA), the axioms (B2), (B3), and (B4) become
derivable. So we obtain a very simple alternative characterization of the logic
of all models where, for all i ∈ I, W ∈ Ni(w): all we need is (B1) and (NEC).
5.2 The T-schema
In the remainder of this section, we will point out a few completeness results
that are less modular, in the sense that they concern frame conditions that are
imposed on all the neighbourhoods Ni(w) for all i ∈ I at once, rather than
for a selection of them. We start with the T-schema: ϕ → ϕ. Let us call a
neighbourhood function reflexive iff, for every w ∈W and for every X ∈ N (w),
w ∈ X .
Theorem 4 The logic of the class of models M = 〈W, 〈Ni〉i∈I , V 〉 where each
Ni is reflexive is axiomatized by adding to the base logic all instances of the
following axiom schema:
Gϕ→ ϕ (TG)
Importantly, one cannot get a complete axiomatization of reflexivity by just
adding the axioms (Ti), i.e. iϕ→ ϕ to the base logic. To see this, note that
all axioms Gφ → φ for G ⊆f I are sound with respect to reflexive frames.
The following example of a non-reflexive frame shows that these axioms do not
logically follow from iϕ → ϕ. We consider a simple case with I = {1, 2}.
Take a model M with two worlds, w and v, where all propositional formulas
are true at both worlds. Suppose now that N1(w) = N1(v) = {{w}} and
N2(w) = N2(v) = {{v}}. Since neither {w} nor {v} correspond to the truth
set of any formula ϕ in this model, 1ϕ and 2ϕ will be false for every ϕ, and
hence (T1) and (T2) will be trivially valid in this model. However, this model
does not validate (T{1,2}), since {1,2}⊥ is true at w and at v. So the model
satisfies all formulas of the form iφ → φ together with (B1) -(B2), but not
Gφ→ φ:
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5.3 Binary Consistency
In any normal modal logic, (P) is equivalent to the following axiom:
ϕ→ ¬¬ϕ (D)
However, in neighbourhoodmodels, the two axioms are non-equivalent. Whereas
(P) expresses that W 6∈ N (w), (D) expresses that if X ∈ N (w), then W \X 6∈
N (w). It can easily be verified that, by adding indexed variants of the (D)-
axiom, we get a complete logic for all frames that satisfy the following frame
condition:
Binary consistency: for all i ∈ I: if X ∈ Ni(w), then W \X 6∈ Ni(w)
Theorem 5 The logic of the class of models M = 〈W, 〈Ni〉i∈I , V 〉 that satisfy
binary consistency is axiomatized by adding to the base logic all instances of the
following axiom schema, for all i ∈ I:
iϕ→ ¬i¬ϕ (Di)
5.4 Closure under Supersets
We call a model M = 〈W, 〈Ni〉i∈I , V 〉 monotone iff, for all i ∈ I and all w ∈W ,
Ni(w) is closed under supersets. This means that for all X ∈ Ni(w), for all
Y ⊆W with X ⊆ Y , also Y ∈ Ni(w).
Theorem 6 The logic of the class of all monotone models is axiomatized by
adding to the base logic all instances of the following axiom schema:
Gϕ→ G(ϕ ∨ ψ) (RMG)
Here we slightly deviate from our standard canonical model construction (Def-
inition 3). To ensure that the canonical model falls in the class of monotone
models, we need to close all neighbourhoods under supersets (cf. Definition 4 in
the Appendix).
Note that in the presence of (RMG), (RE) becomes a derived rule. Also, it
can easily be observed that if we add any (consistent) combination of the axioms
(T), (P), (PG), (NEC) to the base logic + (RMG), then we can prove that the
associated canonical model Mc↑ will be monotone and satisfy the associated
frame condition.
5.5 Closure under Finite and Infinite Intersections
In regular neighbourhood modal logic with one modality , closure of the neigh-
bourhood function under finite intersections yields the axiom of aggregation:
(ϕ ∧ψ)→ (ϕ ∧ ψ). In fact, the logic obtained by adding (RE) and (C) to
classical logic is complete for both, the class of frames where the neighbourhood
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function is closed under finite intersections, and the class of frames where the
neighbourhood function is closed under infinite intersections. We now generalize
this fact to neighbourhood models with pointwise intersection:
Theorem 7 The logic of the class of all models where each Ni(w) is closed
under arbitrary intersections is axiomatized by replacing, in the base logic, the
axiom (B1) with its unrestricted counterpart:
(Gϕ ∧Hψ)→ G∪H(ϕ ∧ ψ) (CG)
For the proof, again, we have to deviate slightly from our canonical model
construction for the base logic, by closing neighbourhoods under arbitrary in-
tersection. Note that (CG) is also sound for the class of models where the
neighbourhood sets are closed under finite intersection. So we immediately ob-
tain:
Corollary 1 The logic of the class of all models where each Ni(w) is closed
under finite intersections is axiomatized by adding to the base logic all instances
of (CG).
6 Summary and Outlook
In this paper, we axiomatized the base logic of neighbourhood models with
pointwise intersection and various extensions obtained by imposing standard
frame conditions on the neighbourhoods for the individual indexes. For the
canonical model construction in our completeness proof we made use of a copy-
ing technique that is – as far as we know – new. In forthcoming work, we
generalize these results, including the operation of pointwise intersection of a
neighbourhood set with itself and establishing the finite model property for the
resulting classes of logics.
Some obvious open questions concern the other (standard) frame conditions
that correspond to well-known axioms such as the (4)-axiom, the (5)-axiom,
and other “usual suspects” in modal logic. Also, one may consider the possi-
bility of adding a universal modality to the logics, which in turn allows one to
express conditions like monotonicity by means of axioms schemata. Finally, one
may consider multi-modal logics where only some of the individual operators
satisfy certain principles (e.g. one non-normal operator for ability, and another
normal operator for belief or knowledge), and check to what extent our current
techniques can be applied to those.
Our definition of the canonical model, we conjecture, can be easily general-
ized to axiomatize other operations on neighbourhood functions. One may e.g.
define pointwise union in a wholly analogous fashion, replacing every occurrence
of ∩ in Definition 1 with ∪. Drawing inspiration from Dynamic Logic, one may
also define various operations of sequential composition of neighbourhoods. In
sum, we believe that the perspective we have tried to sketch here allows for a
plethora of fascinating new logical investigations and philosophical applications.
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For convenience, we restate theorems and lemmas before proving them.
Lemma 0 Axioms (B1)-(B4) are logically independent from each other.
Proof. We sketch the argument that (B1)-(B4) are mutually independent. In
view of the soundness of these axioms w.r.t. models with pointwise intersection,
we can only falsify those axioms in models of a more general type, i.e. where
each of the neighbourhood functions NG are primitive. We stick to the semantic
clauses from Definition 2. All our examples work with a set of agents I =
{1, 2, 3} and a set of worlds W = {wp, wq, wr}, where the atoms p, q, r are true
at wp, wq and wr respectively. The models we construct only differ in their
neighbourhood functions. In the following, whenever a neighbourhood NG(w)
for G ⊆ {1, 2, 3} remains unspecified, we assume that NG(w) = {∅}. Moreover,
all neighbourhood functions are assumed constant, i.e. NG(w) = NG(w′) for all
w,w′ ∈ W . We will write N instead of N (w).
To see that (B1) is independent of (B2)-(B4), we define model M1 as follows:
Let N{1} = {{wp, wr}, ∅} and N{2} = {{wq, wr}, ∅}. It is easy to check that
(B2)-(B4) are valid on this model. First, the antecedent of (B2) is always false.
Second, for (B3) and (B4), the antecedent can only be true if ‖ϕ‖M1 = ∅;
under this condition, the consequent is easily verified. However, we have that
M1, wp |= {1}(p ∨ r) ∧ {2}(q ∨ r) but M1, wp 6|= {1,2}((p ∨ r) ∧ (q ∨ r)),
contradicting (B1).
Next, to show that (B2) is independent of (B1),(B3) and (B4), define the
model M2 by taking neighbourhoods to be N{i} = ℘(W ) \ {1, 2, 3} for all sin-
gletons {i} and NG = ℘(W ) for all G ⊆ I of cardinality at least 2. Note that
for all ϕ and all groups G with cardinality at least 2, Gϕ is true at all worlds
in M2. From this one can easily infer that (B1),(B3) and (B4) are valid in M2.
However, we have M2, wp |= {1,2}⊤ ∧ ¬{1}⊤ contradicting (B2).
To see that (B3) is independent from (B1),(B2) and (B4) consider model
M3 with neighbourhood N{1} = N{1,2,3} = {{wp}, ∅}. Again it’s easy to see
that this model satisfies (B1),(B2) and (B4), but not (B3) as M3, wp |= {1}p∧
{1,2,3}p but M3, wp 6|= {1,2}p.
To see that (B4) is independent of (B1)-(B3) consider model M4 with neigh-
bourhoods N{1,3} = {{wp}, ∅} and N{1,2} = N{1,2,3} = {{wp, wq}, ∅}. It is
easy to see that this model satisfies (B1)-(B3), but not (B4), as M4, wp |=
{1,3}p ∧{1,2}p ∨ q, but M4, wp 6|= {1,2,3}p.
Lemma 0 For any extension ⊢ of the base logic: if for all i ∈ I, ⊢ i⊤ (resp.
⊢ ¬i⊤ or ⊢ i⊥ ), then for all G ⊆f I, ⊢ G⊤ (resp. ⊢ ¬G⊤ or ⊢ G⊥ ).
Proof. Assume ⊢ i⊤ for all i ∈ I and let G ⊆f I. Then an iterated application
of (B1) yields ⊢ G⊤. Likewise, if ⊢ i⊥, an iterated application of (B1) yields
⊢ G⊥. Finally for ⊢ ¬i⊤ note that by (B2), we have that ⊢ G⊤ → j⊤
for all G ⊆f I and j ∈ G. Hence. ⊢
∧
j∈G ¬j⊤ → ¬G⊤.
Theorem 8 The logic of any selection of frame conditions from Table 1 is
axiomatized by adding the corresponding axioms from that table to the base logic.
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Proof.This is a straightforward adaption of the original proof. The only ad-
ditional thing to show is that the XG,φi do not violate any of the four frame
conditions. For (NEC) and (COP) this is immediate. For (P) it follows from
the fact that ∅ ⊂ XG,φi whenever 6⊢ ⊥ ↔ φ or |G| > 2, together with i⊥ 6∈ Λ
for any Λ. For (CONEC) it follows from the fact that XG,φi ⊂ W
c whenever
6⊢ φ↔ ⊤ together with Lemma 5.
Theorem 9 The logic of frame condition ∅ 6∈ NG(w) in conjunction with any
selection of frame conditions from Table 1 is axiomatized by adding to the base
logic the corresponding axioms from that table and all instances of (PG).
Proof. Soundness is a matter of routine: one simply checks that the axiom is
valid whenever the corresponding frame condition holds.
We briefly sketch the completeness proof for (P); for each of the other three
axioms the reasoning is completely analogous. First, we construct the canonical
model according to Definition 3, with the only difference that our maximal
consistent sets are constructed using the stronger logic that also contains the
(P)-axiom. We then prove the auxiliary lemmata and the truth lemma, just as
before (see Lemmas 2, 3, and 4). By the Truth Lemma, we obtain that ∅ ∈
NG(Λ, f) iff G⊥ ∈ Λ. However, for all MCS Λ, we also know that ¬G⊥ ∈ Λ.
Hence, since every such Λ is consistent, we can infer that ∅ 6∈ NG(Λ, f).
Theorem 10 The logic of the class of models M = 〈W, 〈Ni〉i∈I , V 〉 where each
Ni is reflexive is axiomatized by adding to the base logic all instances of the
following axiom schema:
Gϕ→ ϕ (TG)
Proof. Soundness is again a matter of routine. For completeness, we can again
use the canonical model construction from Definition 3. The auxiliary lemmata
and the truth lemma are proven as before; it suffices to show that the frame
condition for (TG) is satisfied. So suppose that X
G,ϕ
i is a member of Ni(Λ, f).
In view of the construction, (a) XG,ϕi is a superset of the set {(Λ
′, f ′) ∈ W c |
ϕ ∈ Λ} and (b) Gϕ ∈ Λ. By (b) and the axiom (TG), also ϕ ∈ Λ, and hence
by (a), for all f ′′ ∈ F, (Λ, f ′′) ∈ XG,ϕi . Consequently, (Λ, f) ∈ X
G,ϕ
i .
Theorem 11 The logic of the class of models M = 〈W, 〈Ni〉i∈I , V 〉 that satisfy
binary consistency is axiomatized by adding to the base logic all instances of the
following axiom schema, for all i ∈ I:
iϕ→ ¬i¬ϕ (Di)
Proof. We can again use the same canonical model construction. It suffices to
show that in the presence of (Di), this model will satisfy binary consistency. So
suppose that i ∈ I, (Λ, f) ∈ W c and X ⊆ W c are such that X,Y ∈ Ni(Λ, f)
where Y = W \ X . Case 1: X is definable, i.e. there is some ϕ such that
X = ‖ϕ‖M
c
. In that case, by the truth lemma, iϕ ∧i¬ϕ ∈ Λ, contradicting
the supposition that Λ is consistent and closed under (Di).
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Case 2: X and Y are not definable. Note that by the construction of Mc,
X = XG,ϕi and Y = Y
H,ψ
i , with i ∈ G ∩ H . Suppose first that G = {i}
or H = {i}. Then by Definition 3 and the truth lemma, X = ‖ϕ‖M
c
or
Y = ‖ψ‖M
c
, contradicting the assumption that neither X nor Y are definable.
So there are j, k such that j ∈ G \ {i} and k ∈ H \ {i}. Let now f ′ ∈ F be
such that f ′(G,ϕ) = j and f ′(H,ϕ) = k, and let Λ be an arbitrary MCS. Note
that (Λ, f ′) ∈ XG,ϕi ∩ Y
H,ψ
i by the construction of M
c. Hence, X ∩ Y 6= ∅,
contradicting the supposition that Y =W \X .
Theorem 12 The logic of the class of all monotone models is axiomatized by
adding to the base logic all instances of the following axiom schema:
Gϕ→ G(ϕ ∨ ψ) (RMG)
Proof. Soundness is a matter of routine. For completeness, we need a slightly
different construction. Let Mc = 〈W c, 〈N ci 〉i∈I , V
c〉 be defined as before – see
Definition 3. Now, define Mc↑ as follows:
Definition 4 Mc↑ = 〈W
c, 〈N c↑i 〉i∈I , V
c〉, where for all (Λ, f) ∈ W c, N c↑i (Λ, f)
is the closure of N ci (Λ, f) under supersets: N
c↑
i (Λ, f) = {Y ⊆W
c | for an X ∈
N ci (Λ, f), X ⊆ Y }.
Note that lemmas 2 and 3 are preserved, since these only concern the sets
X
G,ϕ
i that are used in the construction of each Ni. The truth lemma however
needs to be proved anew. Again, the crucial point is to prove the induction step
for G:
Mc↑, (Λ, f) |= Gϕ iff Gϕ ∈ Λ (TL ↑)
For the right-to-left direction of (TL ↑), we can simply repeat the proof of
the right-to-left direction of (TL). For left-to-right, some small changes are
required, which we spell out here.
Suppose that Mc↑, (Λ, f) |= Gϕ. By the semantic clause for G, there is a
Z = {Zi | i ∈ G} such that each Zi ∈ N
c↑
i (Λ, f) and
⋂
i∈G Zi = ‖ϕ‖
M
c
↑ . By
the construction, for each Zi ∈ Z there is an Xi ∈ Ni(Λ, f) such that Xi ⊆ Zi.
Hence,
⋂
i∈G
Xi ⊆ ‖ϕ‖
M
c
↑ (17)
We define A as before. Note that, in view of the preceding, each N c↑i (Λ, f)
with i ∈ G is non-empty. This implies that for all i ∈ G, there is some ψi and
some Gi that contains i, such that Giψi ∈ Λ. By (B2), iψi ∈ Λ and hence
by (RMG), also
i⊤ ∈ Λ for all i ∈ G (18)
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Case 1: ϕ is a tautology. By (18), using (B1) G⊤ ∈ Λ. By (RE), Gϕ ∈ Λ.
Case 2: ϕ is not a tautology. Define B as before. We can now reason just as
before, but instead of deriving an identity, we get at the following set inclusion:
⋂
(H,ψ)∈B
{(Λ′, f ′) ∈W c | ψ ∈ Λ′} ⊆ {(Λ′, f ′) ∈W c | ϕ ∈ Λ′} (19)
Hence, every MCS that contains every member of {ψ | (H,ψ) ∈ B} also contains
ϕ. Since B is finite, this gives us:
⊢
∧
(H,ψ)∈B
ψ → ϕ. (20)
By Definition 3.3, Hψ ∈ Λ for all (H,ψ) ∈ B. Let K =
⋃
(H,ψ)∈BH . Note
that, by (7), K ⊆ G. Applying (B1) a suitable number of times, we can derive
that K
∧
(H,ψ)∈B ψ ∈ Λ. By (RMG) and (20),
Kϕ ∈ Λ (21)
From there, we can follow the exact same reasoning as that in the proof for
the base logic, starting after equation (13).
Theorem 13 The logic of the class of all models where each Ni(w) is closed
under arbitrary intersections is axiomatized by replacing, in the base logic, the
axiom (B1) with its unrestricted counterpart:
(Gϕ ∧Hψ)→ G∪H(ϕ ∧ ψ) (CG)
Proof. Soundness is again a matter of routine. For completeness we close all
the neighbourhood functions of the canonical model for the base logic under
intersection:
Definition 5 Mc∩ = 〈W
c, 〈N c∩i 〉i∈I , V
c〉, where for all (Λ, f) ∈ W c, N c∩i (Λ, f)
is the closure of N ci (Λ, f) under (possibly infinite) intersections: N
c∩
i (Λ, f) =
{
⋂
Y | Y ⊆ N ci (Λ, f)}.
Again, right-to-left of the truth lemma for G is easy, since we only added
neighbourhoods to the original canonical model. For left-to-right, we need a
slightly different reasoning. Suppose that Mc∩, (Λ, f) |= Gϕ. So there is a
Z = {Zi | i ∈ G} such that each Zi ∈ N c∩i (Λ, f), and
⋂
Z = ‖ϕ‖M
c∩
. By
the definition of Mc∩, for every Zi ∈ Z there is a Xi ⊆f Ni(Λ, f) such that
Zi =
⋂
Xi. Let X =
⋃
i∈G Xi. Note that
⋂
X =
⋂
Z. Let A = {(H,ψ) ∈
G × L | XH,ψi ∈ X for some i ∈ H} and let B = {(H,ψ) ∈ G × L | X
H,ψ
i ∈
X for all i ∈ H}. Note that for all (H,ψ) ∈ B, H ⊆ G.
We now reason as before, deriving the following equation:
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⋂(H,ψ)∈B
{(Λ, f) ∈ W c | ψ ∈ Λ} = {(Λ, f) ∈ W c | ϕ ∈ Λ} (22)
In other words, every maximal consistent set that contains all ψ for (H,ψ) ∈
B also contains ϕ, and vice versa. Note however that B needn’t be finite. By
the compactness of our syntactic consequence relation however, it follows that
there is a finite C ⊆ B such that:
∧
(H,ψ)∈C
ψ ↔ ϕ (23)
Put K =
⋃
(H,ψ)∈CH . In view of the preceding, K ⊆ G. From there, we
reason as before, deriving that Kϕ ∈ Λ, and finally also that Gϕ ∈ Λ.
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